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Abstract
Using original Ugandan data collected by the authors, we examine the determinants of
funding to local NGOs. We begin by presenting a simple theoretical model of crowding out.
We then turn to the empirical estimation. We nd that success in attracting grants from
international donors depends mostly on network e¤ects. In contrast, NGOs that raise in
kind resources locally tend to be young NGOs managed by someone who is simultaneously
employed elsewhere. We nd evidence of crowding out: NGOs that receive grant funding are
less likely to obtain resources locally, whether in cash or in kind. But crowding out seems to
be primarily the result of selection: once we control for NGO xed e¤ects, we nd no evidence
that NGOs receive less revenue from fees and donation after obtaining a grant. These results
suggest that donors regard Ugandan NGOs as sub-contractors of their developmental e¤ort,
not as charitable organizations in their own right.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have seen a rising involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the
development process (e.g. Edwards & Hulme 1995, Hulme & Edwards 1997). This phenomenon
is partly a consequence of dissatisfaction with government performance in the delivery of public
services. As a result, international NGOs as well as bilateral and multalateral donors increasingly
seek to channel development funding through local NGOs. As a result, the NGO sector has
grown rapidly in developing countries. What is unclear is whether donors, through their funding,
encourage the blossoming of a local charitable sector, or whether local NGOs are nothing but
sub-contractors for international development agencies.
The general presumption is that NGOs operating in poor countries are charitable organiza-
tions, by which we mean that they have an altruistic or philanthropic purpose that is shared
by their members and promoters. Much of the dissatisfaction of donors with government pub-
lic service delivery originates in concerns over corruption. The general sentiment is that civil
servants running government schools and health centers are motivated by self-interest, and this
explains why they divert resources from the public (e.g. Reinikka & Svensson 2003, Lindelow,
Reinikka & Svensson 2003). NGOs, in contrast, are thought to be less selsh and thus less likely
to divert funds. The belief in the altruistic motivation of NGOs underlies the switch in donor
funding.
A number of authors have voiced doubts that the motives of NGO promoters in poor countries
are rst and foremost charitable (e.g. Edwards & Hulme 1995, Platteau & Gaspart 2003). But
these doubts are in general based on a limited number of case studies. There does not exist an
investigation of these issues using a large representative sample of NGOs. Given the increasing
importance of local NGOs and their potential for delivering services, this lacuna needs to be
lled. The purpose of this paper is to throw some light on this issue by examining the factors
1
that inuence the capacity of local NGOs to attract external resources. To this e¤ect we use a
nationally representative survey of 300 NGOs that we helped conduct in Uganda.
NGOs obtain resources in a variety of ways. Some resources are raised in cash nancial
grants, membership fees. Other are raised in kind  volunteer work, complimentary use of
equipment and facilities. In the case of Uganda, Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2003) have shown
that international grants are by far the major source of funding for the domestic NGO sector as
a whole. They also point out that, among small NGOs, membership fees and donations play a
much more important role. This raises the possibility that the local NGOs that receive donor
funding are in some fundamental sense di¤erent from NGOs that attract voluntary contributions
from nationals. To investigate this, we examine the factors that inuence the capacity of local
NGOs to successfully obtain grant funding. We contrast them with the determinants of voluntary
contributions in cash and in kind.
We rst approach this issue from a reduced form perspective and we examine whether the
ex ante characteristics of NGOs receiving grant funding are the same as those that do not. We
nd that NGOs receiving external funding di¤er markedly from those that do not: they are
much more likely to be part of an international network and to be managed by an educated,
well connected manager. We also nd that grant recipients on average raise fewer resources
domestically.
We then seek to understand whether donor funding displaces voluntary contributions from
nationals. We are interested to know whether international funding acts as a complement or
substitute for local charity. One possibility is that local NGOs are genuinely altruistic orga-
nizations whose e¤ectiveness is enhanced by external funding. In this case we would expect
externally funded NGOs to expand and attract more local resources. Another possibility is that
local NGOs act as sub-contractors for international donors, in which case raising local funding
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does not matter. It is also conceivable that local NGOs are altruistic but that external funding
crowds out their own willingness to give.
This is a di¢ cult issue to investigate, especially given the fact that we do not have longitudi-
nal data and hence cannot compare locally raised resources before and after an NGO receives
a grant. Using an instrumental variable approach instead, we nd evidence that grant recipients
raise fewer resources locally, notably in the form of member fees and contributions.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that grants from external donors are not encouraging
the local emergence of a charitable sector. Many local NGOs seem to be created not with an
altruistic motive in mind but for the purpose of obtaining grant funding.1 This interpretation
is reinforced by the very large number of Uganda NGOs that only have a shadowy existence
if they do not receive an external grant. For instance, of the 1700 or so NGOs registered in
Kampala at the time of the survey, only a quarter could be located. Grants do not appear to go
to NGOs that would raise funds on their own if they were not funded externally. Rather they
go to a relatively small number of well educated, well connected organizations and individuals
skilled at writing grant applications.
Before we move on to the analysis, an important remark is in order. Observing that grant
recipients do not raise local resources does not imply that they do a bad job of delivering services
to the population. But it calls into question the assumption that underlies the switch away from
government services: if local NGOs are not driven by an altruistic motive, why should they
be trusted to behave in a less opportunistic manner than civil servants? There may be other
reasons for donors to prefer private service delivery, such as better control, faster response to
emergencies, or the promotion of a specic message or agenda. But based on the evidence
presented here it would be foolish to rely on its supposed altruism to economize on monitoring.
1At the time of the survey, in Uganda there were only 400 registered (for-prot) rms but 3500 registered
NGOs.
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The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 3 by presenting the conceptual
framework that underlies our empirical analysis. A model is constructed in which a local NGO
receives external funding from an altruistic donor. Section 3 presents the data, which come from
a survey of Ugandan NGOs. The empirical analysis is discussed in Section 4.
2. Conceptual framework
But before getting onto the empirical analysis, we need a conceptual framework with which to
interpret the data. To this e¤ect, we construct a simple interaction model between a donor and a
local service provider the NGO. Both organizations are assumed to have altruistic motivations,
but the strength of their altruism may vary. NGOs also di¤er in terms of competence.
The purpose of the model is to identify the circumstances under which grants from the donor
and local fundraising by the local service provider are complement or substitute. The main
underlying assumption is that the donor cares only about the welfare of the target population.
Consequently, the donor wishes to fund the NGO with the biggest bang-for-the buck, that
is, the organization that generates the largest increase in welfare for a given level of donor
funding. NGO e¤ectiveness in turn depends on its altruism and competence. If grant and local
funding are complement, an altruitic grant recipient raises more local resources, and this raises
its e¤ectiveness. This is the principle at work behind the practice of matching contributions.
In contrast, if grant and local funding are substitute or if local funding is too small only
competence matters: the donor allocates the grant to the most capable NGO, irrespective of its
level of altruism. If the NGO is not altruistic at all, it may still receive the grant if it is more
capable than less competent but altruistically minded NGOs. In this case, the NGO is basically
a for-prot sub-contractor of the donor.
We begin by presenting the decision process of the NGO, before turning to that of the donor.
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2.1. The NGOs decision
Consider an altruistic non-governmental organization, hereafter called the NGO.2 We think
of this organization as made of members and promoters who have come together to serve a
beneciary target group. Beneciary welfare is denoted V (t; z) where t is the cost to the NGO
of the service provided to beneciaries. Variable z is an exogenously given NGO characteristic
that denotes how competent it is in serving the beneciary group.
We assume that @V@t > 0;
@V
@z > 0, and
@V 2
@t@z > 0. The rst two assumptions state that the
welfare gain to beneciaries increases in the size of the transfer and in the competence of the
NGO. The latter assumption means that more competent NGOs are more productive, i.e., that
an incremental transfer t generates a higher increase in beneciary welfare if NGO competence
z is higher. For now we also assume that @V
2
@t2
< 0, i.e., that the marginal welfare gain for the
beneciaries falls with the size of the transfer. This may be due to satiation or to increasing
marginal cost in the production of services.
The NGO starts with a stock of resources T which for now we take as given. This stock of
resources is meant to include the nancial resources of members and promoters as well as the
value of their time. The NGO must decide how much of T to allocate to the beneciary target
group. The rest is consumed by the organization (i.e., by members and promoters).
The decision problem facing the NGO can be written:
max
t
V (t; z) + !U(T   t) subject to t  T
where ! is a welfare weight measuring how much the NGO cares about the welfare of its pro-
2 In the context of this model, altruism and joy-of-giving are basically equivalent so we do not emphasize the
distinction between the two. For a discussion, see for instance Ribar & Wilhelm (2002) and the references cited
therein.
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moters. We assume that U(:) is increasing and concave, that is, that the marginal utility of
consumption falls with consumption  U 00 < 0. The rst order condition and second order
conditions for an interior optimum are of the form:
@V (t; z)
@t
  !U 0(T   t) = 0
@2V
@t2
+ !U 00 < 0
Let t(T; z; !) denote the NGO decision regarding the amount of transfer it makes to target
beneciaries. Using simple comparative statics, we can sign dt=dT , dt=dz and dt=d!:

@2V
@t2
+ !U 00

dt  !U 00dT = 0
dt
dT
=
!U 00
SOC
> 0
@2V
@t2
+ !U 00

dt  U 0d! = 0
dt
d!
=
U 0
SOC
< 0
@2V
@t2
+ !U 00

dt+
@2V
@t@z
dz = 0
dt
dz
=  
@2V
@t@z
SOC
< 0
As anticipated, organizations with more resources (higher T ) or more altruism (lower !) give
more while more competent organizations (higher z) give less.3
We also see that, with the assumptions we have made so far, the amount given t increases
3This model prediction follows mostly from the additive separability of the objective function, which imposes
restrictions on the substitution elasticity between own and beneciary consumption. This prediction could be
reversed in a more general objective function of the form W (t; T   t; z) allowing for arbitrary substitution betwee
the two.
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less than proportionally with NGO resources:
dt
dT
=
!U 00
@2V
@t2
+ !U 00
=
1
1 +
@2V
@t2
!U 00
< 1 (2.1)
since U 00 < 0 and @
2V
@t2
< 0 by assumption. Put di¤erently, an additional $1 of resources translates
into less than 1$ in additional transfers.
This result hinges critically on the assumption that the marginal welfare gain falls with t.
As is clear from (2.1), if we assume instead that @
2V
@t2
> 0, we obtain dt=dT > 1.4 This would be
the case, for instance, if there are threshold e¤ects in consumption for instance if the utility of
beneciaries increases faster than cost over a certain range or if there are increasing returns
in service delivery for instance because of xed setup costs. To summarize, whether transfers
increase more or less than proportionally with resources depends on the sign of @
2V
@t2
and, hence,
on whether marginal delivery costs are increasing or decreasing.
2.2. Crowding out
We now turn to the decision facing an international donor wishing to serve the same beneciary
target group. We assume that the donor has a xed budget G. The donor can serve the
beneciary population directly but, being unfamiliar with local circumstances, it has a low z,
say zd. The donor can also serve its target population indirectly by funding a local NGO.
Whenever dtdT < 1, part of the grant will be captured by the NGO. In response to this,
the NGO may seek to monitor the NGO, that is, to impose conditions on the amount of the
grant G that can be appropriated by the NGO. This is very di¢ cult to do because of fungibility
4 In order to retain an interior solution, we assume that U 00 is su¢ ciently negative and ! large enough that the
second order condition is satised.
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between G and T : members and promoters can enjoy more consumption without encroaching on
G simply by reducing transfers out of their own resources T e.g, by reducing their donations
in time and money to the NGO. Put di¤erently, whenever dtdT < 1 transferring G to an NGO
will normally result is less than an increment G being transferred to the beneciary population.
The di¤erence is:
D  G  (t(T +G; z; !)  t(T; z; !)) (2.2)
Expression D is what we refer to as crowding out: NGOs that receive grants generate fewer
voluntary donations of time and money.
In contrast, if @
2V
@t2
> 0 and hence dtdT > 1, there is a multiplier e¤ect: the funds disbursed by
the donor enable the NGO to go over a minimum threshold or to reap increasing returns to scale,
and the NGO members and promoters respond by volunteering more of their own resources since
they are now more productive in achieving their altruistic goal. To conclude, whether external
and internal funds are substitutes or complement depend on whether @
2V
@t2
is positive or negative.
One important special case is when the local NGO would not make any transfer to the bene-
ciary population in the absence of donor grant. This could occur for two reasons: either because
the NGO is not altruistic, or because the NGO is altruistic but its members and promoters are
too poor to get over a minimum e¢ cient threshold in service delivery. In the second case, the
grant will have a multiplier e¤ect and transfers from members and promoters will increase as
a result of the grant. In contrast, in the rst case there will be crowding out in the sense that
NGO members and promoters will divert some of the grant to their own consumption T   t.
The NGO is basically a for-prot sub-contractor for the donor. In this case, it is reasonable for
the donor to worry about excessive diversion of donor funds and the donor may want to closely
monitor the grant recipient.
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2.3. The donors decision
In practice, observing crowding out is complicated by donor selection. If all NGOs are equally
likely to receive donor grants, testing crowding out simply requires that we compare voluntary
donations of time and money between grant recipients and non-recipients. Unfortunately, grants
are not allocated in a random manner.
To develop some intuition on how the selection process is likely to take place, we imagine
that donors have the choice between several local NGOs with di¤erent T; z and !.5 Presumably,
they prefer to fund the NGO that yields the highest beneciary welfare gain, that is, the NGO
with the highest bang for the buckB:
B  V (t(T +G; z; !); z)  V (t(T; z; !); z) (2.3)
In other words, the donor ranks NGOs according to their B and give the grant to the one with the
highest B. Understanding how donors select grant recipients thus boils down to understanding
the relationship between B and T; z and !.
We begin with !. Totally di¤erentiating (2.3), we obtain:
dB
d!
=
@V (t(T +G; z; !); z)
@t
dt(T +G; z; !)
d!
  @V (t(T; z; !); z)
@t
dt(T; z; !)
d!
(2.4)
By our assumption that @V
2
@t2
< 0 and our earlier result that dtdT > 0, it follows that
@V (t(T+G;z;!);z)
@t <
@V (t(T;z;!);z)
@t . We have also shown that
dt
d! < 0. A su¢ cient condition for
dB
d! < 0 is thus that
dt(T+G;z;!)
d! be smaller than
dt(T;z;!)
d! in the absolute sense. Since
dt
d! =
U 0
SOC and U
0 is decreasing
5For simplicity, we assume in this simple model that all funding G from a specic donor goes to a single NGO.
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in t, it follows that d
2t
d!dT is in general positive.
6 Consequently it follows that dBd! < 0: the donor
should not fund a selsh NGO.
Turning to T , we obtain the following expression by again totally di¤erentiating (2.3):
dB
dT
=
@V (t(T +G; z; !); z)
@t
dt(T +G; z; !)
dT
  @V (t(T; z; !); z)
@t
dt(T; z; !)
dT
(2.5)
As before, @V (t(T+G;z;!);z)@t <
@V (t(T;z;!);z)
@t . A su¢ cient condition for
dB
dT to be negative is thus
that dt(T+G;z;!)dT  dt(T;z;!)dT , which is normally the case.7
The above analysis shows that, provided that U 000 and @
3V
@T 3
are su¢ ciently small, the donor
can expect a larger welfare gain to the target population if funds are given to a more altruistic
NGO (lower !) or less wealthy NGO (lower T ). The intuition behind the result for ! is fairly
straightforward: a selsh NGO will divert more funds towards the welfare of its members and
promoters. The intuition behind the result for T is that poor NGOs are constrained in what
they can give. Controlling for competence, giving them more funding enables them to increase
their assistance to the target population more than a less constrained NGO. In other words,
crowding out is predicted to be less severe among poor NGOs.
The role of NGO competence z is slightly harder to pin down. Totally di¤erentiating (2.3)
6 Indeed we have
d2t
d!dT
=
d
dT
(U 0SOC 1)
=  U 00 dt
dT
SOC 1   U 0SOC2 dSOC
dT
A su¢ cient condition for this d
2t
d!dT
> 0 is that dSOC
dT
 0, which we will assume. This condition is fullled, for
instance, when U 000 = @
3V
@T3
= 0.
7 It can be shown that a su¢ cient condition for d
2t
dT2
= 0 and thus dt(T+G;z;!)
dT
 dt(T;z;!)
dT
is that U 000 = @
3V
@T3
= 0.
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with respect to z yields:
dB
dz
=

@V (t(T +G; z; !); z)
@z
  @V (t(T; z; !); z)
@z

+

@V (t(T +G; z; !); z)
@t
dt(T +G; z; !)
dz
  @V (t(T; z; !); z)
@t
dt(T; z; !)
dz

(2.6)
Since we assumed that @V
2
@t@z > 0, the rst term is positive: more competent NGOs are better at
transforming additional funding into beneciary welfare. The second term captures the NGOs
adjustment in its transfer level as a response to receiving G. This e¤ect is di¢ cult to sign a
priori. Provided it is small enough, as we will assume, the direct e¤ect dominates and it is in
the donors interest to fund a competent NGO, i.e., dBdz > 0. To summarize, donors are more
likely to fund NGOs that are more altruistic, more competent, and less rich.
2.4. Private contributions and user fees
We have shown that expenditures t on the beneciary population increase with T and ! and
that crowding out is most severe when ! is low. So far we have interpreted this as an altruism
e¤ect: when NGO promoters care more about the welfare of the beneciary population, they
are less likely to reduce their voluntary contributions. There are other possible interpretations,
however.
One alternative interpretation of ! is that it measures honesty. Nothing in the model requires
that t > G. A dishonest promoter would not mind setting setting t < G, thereby diverting
outside funds towards personal consumption. In this context, parameter ! can be seen as
measuring how much guilt or shame NGO promoters would feel from diverting outside funds. It
is obvious that donors prefer honest NGOs since the private welfare of NGO promoters does not
enter its objective function. In the extreme case where all funds are diverted, there is complete
crowding out: t = 0 and D = G. In the context of our model, altruism and dishonesty are two
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sides of the same coin.
It is also conceivable that NGOs raise local private funds in addition to grants given by
donors. The literature on charitable contributions has typically couched the discussion of crowd-
ing out in terms of public versus private outside funds (Ribar & Wilhelm 2002). This is largely
due to the fact that the literature so far has focused on developed countries where charitable
contributions from the general public are common. A distinction has been drawn between altru-
ism i.e., concerns for the utility of the beneciary population and joy-of-giving which does
not depend on the welfare of beneciaries. Free riding among altruistic benefactors leads to a
reduction of voluntary contributions as the number of benefactors increases. Ribar & Wilhelm
(2002) show that, when altruism is the only reason for giving, for many functional forms and
parameter values public funds crowd out private contributions one for one, i.e., one additional
dollar of public money reduces private contributions by one dollar. In our model free riding does
not arise since, by construction, there is a single contributor. In the case of multiple private con-
tributors, free riding adds another source of crowding out, in which case the distinction between
altruism and joy-of-giving becomes relevant. We refer the interested reader to the literature
for a detailed discussion of these issues. Here !U(T   t) can be regarded as a reduced form
summarizing the equilibrium of the private contribution game.
It is also possible to expand the model to allow for active fundraising on the part of the
NGO. Modeling this process in detail would take too much space, so we limit ourselves to a
few essential observations. Imagine that the NGO has a (probabilistic) production function for
obtaining grants and private funds. Fundraising takes time and e¤ort from NGO promoters,
thereby subtracting from t.8 When the NGO has no grant, the opportunity cost of promoter
time is low and the NGO devotes more e¤ort to raise private funds. When the NGO receives
8This implicitly assumes that the NGO cannot hire fundraising sta¤ at constant cost, i.e., there is some kind
of capacity constraint on fundraising.
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a grant, the opportunity cost of the promoters time rises, thereby reducing private fundraising
e¤ort. This is another source of crowding out. Again, we can think of !U(T t) as incorporating
this e¤ect.
User fees are a di¤erent issue. So far we have assumed that private benefactors do not
themselves benet from the activities of the NGO. If they do, their contribution can potentially
be seen as a payment for service, or user fee. Without going into the details of the level at which
user fees are set,9 we simply note that revenue from user fees is an increasing function of NGO
output t: an NGO that produces nothing receives no user fees. To the extent that receiving a
grant enables the NGO to produce more, it also increases revenue from user fees.
In our data, it is di¢ cult to distinguish between user fees and charitable contributions. This
is because user fees are often recorded as membership fees and NGO members are typically
beneciaries of its activities (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens 2005). Without detailed information on
the explicit or implicit conditionality attached to membership fees, it is impossible to separate
the fee-for-service element from charitable giving. The important thing to keep in mind is
that income from membership fees is likely to increase with grant income, thereby generating a
multiplier e¤ect rather that goes in the direction opposite to crowding out.
2.5. Asymmetric information
So far we have worked under the assumption that the donor observes the characteristics T; z
and ! and e¤ort t of the NGO. In practice, donors are not fully informed about the type and
e¤ort of grant applicants. Although the presence of imperfect information does not invalidate
what we have said about crowding out, it has implications regarding the empirical analysis.
9 If the user fee is equal to willingness to pay, whether or not the NGO creates a net welfare gain for beneciaries
depends entirely on whether the private sector could o¤er an identical service. If the user fee is less than willingness
to pay, the intervention includes a transfer element. In our context, it is fair to assume that a transfer element is
present.
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Donors may seek to observe e¤ort t through monitoring. This can be accomplished in a
variety of ways e.g., reporting requirements, eld visits, survey of benefactors, audit which
are all costly. Monitoring diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to beneciaries.10
It is therefore in the interest of donors to economize on monitoring. We have noted that, if the
NGO is altruistic (in the sense of a low !), diversion of funds is not a concern. Diversion only
becomes a serious issue if the NGO has a high !. In the extreme case in which the NGO is
nothing but a for-prot sub-contractor for the donor, monitoring is essential. Donors are thus
more likely to monitor NGOs whose altruism or honesty they are suspicious about.
Given that monitoring is costly but e¤ort depends on NGO type, donors would like to know
the NGOs type particularly its altruism ! and its competence z. Screening is thus likely.
In their e¤ort to screen out high !/low z NGOs, donors may rely on statistical discrimination
 using observable characteristics to infer unobservable traits. For instance, they may rely
on observed voluntary contributions to the NGO as an indication about promotersaltruism.
Donors may also surmise that private contributors may be better informed about NGO type,
and rely on private donations as a signal that the NGO is a good one. This raises the risk
of selection bias: if donors prefer NGOs that raise local funds, in a cross-section analysis, we
should observe a correlation between grants and private contributions, biasing the results against
nding evidence of crowding out. We have to keep this in mind when interpreting the results.
If one donor relies on the action of another donor to infer something about unobservable
type, herding is likely to arise: once an NGO has succeeded in demonstrating its reliability
with better informed contributors, it gains easier access to less informed ones. By the same
reasoning, an NGO that has secured funding from one donor may nd it easier to subsequently
obtain funding from another. This raises the potential gain from signaling: dishonest NGOs
10This is true whether the monitoring cost is borne by the donor (e.g., eld visit) or by the grant recipient (e.g.,
reporting). Cost minimization should dictate the allocation of monitoring tasks between donor and recipient.
14
may manipulate the signal in order to improve their chance of obtaining a grant. Of course, if
donors understand this, the signal no longer has value.
Relational contracting is a common method for economizing on screening and monitoring.
By embedding the grant allocation process in a repeated game between the donor and NGO, the
donor can address both problems at the same time: by continuing to deal with NGOs that have
proved reliable in the past, the donor economizes on screening; by threatening to discontinue
funding to low achievers, it can discipline e¤ort. The threat of discontinuing funding is only
e¤ective against NGOs with a su¢ ciently low ! and su¢ ciently high z. NGOs that are incom-
petent and dishonest will simply take the money and run. A system of contract enforcement
based on repeated interaction cannot totally eliminate fraud, a point that is discussed in detail
by Fafchamps (2002) in the context of market transactions.11 International donors probably
fear the bad publicity associated with funding fraudulent or ine¤ective NGOs, because it would
a¤ect their own capacity to raise funds from the public in their home country. For this reason,
we expect donors to be conservative in their choice of grant recipients, displaying a strong pref-
erence for NGOs with which they have worked in the past, or for individuals with whom they
have previously dealt in other NGOs.
The di¢ culty of identifying reliable NGOs, combined with the bad publicity risk associated
with possible fraud, is likely to result in inertia and favoritism: afraid to make a bad choice,
donors are likely to experiment little with new faces, preferring instead to work with NGOs
they already know. This, in turn, reduces competition among existing NGOs and makes entry
di¢ cult for new ones. As a result, the productivity of the sector may be poor.
While these issues are not the focus of this paper, any study of grant funding must keep them
in mind, especially when identifying factors that need to be controlled for in the econometric
11To limit the wastage of funds on ine¤ective or dishonest NGOs, donors may start small, giving only small
grants to NGOs that are unknown to them (Watson 1999).
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analysis.
2.6. Testing strategy
Our objective is to identify the factors that a¤ect NGOscapacity to raise internal and external
funds and resources. Let internal resources in cash and in kind, be denoted Ci and external
grants be denoted Gi. We rst estimate reduced forms and regress Ci and Gi on various NGO
characteristics Qi that proxy for their competence, wealth, and level of altruism:
Ci = 0 + 1Qi + ui (2.7)
Gi = 0 + 1Qi + vi (2.8)
If, as they often claim, donors rely on NGOsaltruism to minimize incentive problems, we
expect the same variables to be signicant in both (2.7) and (2.8): factors that make it more
likely that an NGO raises internal funds should also explain success in raising external funds.
As discussed earlier, one possible exception is the wealth of the NGO members and promoters:
if they are rich, they may contribute more internal funds but receive fewer external funds.
If NGOs are regarded as sub-contractors by external donors, our model predicts that only
competence matters. Since donors do not expect NGO promoters to contribute or to raise
private funds locally, their wealth and altruism are irrelevant to donors. If this were the case, we
would expect variables measuring wealth and altruism to be signicant in the internal resource
regression (2.7) but not in the external resource regression (2.8).
It is also conceivable that donors shy away from NGOs that, thanks to their religious activi-
ties, are more successful at raising charitable funds locally. Most international donors are secular
organizations; they are reticent to facilitate religious proselitization by funding churchessocial
activities. It is, however, reasonable to expect religious organizations to be more altruistic, at
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least towards their followers.12 If donors care a lot about altruism, they may overcome their
secular leanings and choose to operate via religious organizations.
We are also interested in measuring the extent of crowding out. To this e¤ect, we wish to
compare t(T + G; z; !)   G for grant recipients to t(T; z; !) for non-recipients. We do this in
two ways. First we regress voluntary contributions Ci to NGO i by members and promoters on
whether the NGO is a grant recipient Gi and a set of controls Qi:
Ci = 0 + 1Gi + 2Qi + ei (2.9)
This is also the approach adopted by Ribar & Wilhelm (2002) to measure crowding out. The
di¢ culty with this approach is the possible presence of endogeneity bias: NGOs that were
unsuccessful in raising grant funding may subsequently put more e¤ort in generating local and
internal resources to keep the organization going. To correct for this possibility, we instrument
Gi using variables that explains grant allocation but not crowding out, that is, factors that
a¤ect the probability of receiving a grant independently from beneciary considerations. As we
have discussed in the previous sub-section, one such factor is favoritism: because of asymmetric
information NGOs may be more likely to receive grants from donors who are closer to them
socially or contractually. Variables proxying for favoritism can thus be used to instrument
access to grants.
We also use a second approach. Suppose we nd that 1 < 0. Does this necessarily implies
crowding out? Not necessarily. It possible that, for some unknown reasons, donors are attracted
to NGOs that are less involved in raising internal or local funds. If this were the case, we
would observe a negative relationship between Ci and Gi, even after instrumenting, but this
12The Movement for the Restauration of the Ten Commandments of God is a stark exception: in the 1990s
church o¢ cials slaughtered hundreds of Ugandan followers after having induced them to bequeath their assets to
the church.
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relationship would be due to reverse selection by donors.
To investigate this possibility, we use a panel analysis approach. Each NGO was asked to
provide income statements for two consecutive years. We can thus see whether NGOs respond
to a change in grant funding by adjusting internal and local funding. The approach o¤ers the
advantage of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
The two approaches nevertheless complement each other. The second approach indicates
whether grant funding induces crowding out in existing NGOs. The rst approach indicates
whether donors induce crowding out in the sectors as a whole, favoring the emergence of NGOs
that are less involved in internal and local nancing and operate basically as sub-contractors
for external donors.
3. The data
In 2002 Barr, Fafchamps and Owens undertook the rst nationally representative survey of
NGOs in Uganda. The survey, initially proposed by a group of Ugandan NGOs, was organized
by the World Bank in collaboration with the O¢ ce of the Prime Minister of Uganda, with
funding provided by the Japanese government and the World Bank. The survey was undertaken
by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) of Oxford University in collaboration
with International Development Consultants (IDC), based in Kampala.
The survey collected information on what the sector does, its sources of funding, and details
about its personnel, including questions on characteristics of the leader of the NGO. A two-step
sample selection process was used. In the rst step, we identied a list of districts in which data
collection was to take place. The capital city Kampala was included because of its importance as
a base for many NGOs. In addition, 14 districts were randomly selected from the 56 remaining
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districts.13 A random sample of NGOs was then selected 100 from the capital city of Kampala
and 200 from the 14 rural districts. For sampling purposes, an NGO was said to belong to a
particular district if its headquarters were in that district.
In order to draw a random sample of NGOs, we rst constructed a listing of all active NGOs
in the selected districts. Our starting point for this task was the record of the NGO Registration
Board in the Ministry of Internal A¤airs (MIA).14 As of December 2000, approximately 3,500
NGOs were registered with the Board. However, not all of these were operational. So, before
sampling the registers for the selected districts were updated and veried. The results of this
verication exercise are discussed in detail in Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2005). A sample of
100 NGOs was then drawn randomly from the 451 Kampala-based NGOs that could be traced.
For the rural districts, a self weighting sample of 200 NGOs was randomly selected from veried
listings for the 14 randomly selected rural districts. The combined stratied sample (Kampala
plus districts) is roughly representative of the national situation. Further details relating to the
sampling procedure can be found in Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2003).15
13The 14 selected districts were Arua, Busia, Iganga, Jinja, Kabale, Kassese, Kibaale, Lira, Luwero, Mbale,
Mbarara, Mukono, Rakai and Wakiso. One district (Gulu) that was initially included in the list was subsequently
replaced because of the lack of security in the region.
14The registry does not include the Catholic Church, the Church of Uganda (Anglican), and the Uganda Muslim
Supreme Council, three organizations that have been operating in the country for many years; for this reason,
these organizations are omitted from the survey in spite of their large size. This must be kept in mind when
interpreting the results.
15A detailed questionnaire was designed and pre-tested in Uganda by the authors with the help of Abigail Barr.
The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews between enumerators and an NGO representative 
usually the head of the NGO. The enumerators and their supervisors received a weeks training on the questionnaire
and on interviewing techniques before the survey began. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Barr,
Fafchamps & Owens (2003).
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Univariate analysis
We now proceed with the analysis. Based on the data, we rst construct a measure of Vi as
nancial contributions to the NGO received from members through fees and donations. This
information is only available for a sub-sample of the dataset (199 respondents) who agreed to
provide nancial accounts. But we also have data for the full sample on the number of full-time
volunteer sta¤; the total time volunteered during last 12 months, and whether the NGO has
complimentary use of o¢ ce space, buildings or vehicles. Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2005) have
shown that these are important resources, especially for non grant recipients.
For Gi we use two di¤erent measures: a dummy that takes value 1 if the NGO received a
grant in the 12 months preceding the survey, and the value of grant funding received in the
last scal year. Again, the latter information is only available for the respondents who provided
nancial data. We revisit this issue when we perform robustness tests below.
The qualications and experience of the NGO manager are used as measures of NGO compe-
tence z. Manager qualication variables include age, education, and work experience. Because
the NGO manager is nearly always its promoter, the wealth and parental background of the
NGO manager are used as controls for wealth T . Altruism ! is proxied by a dummy variable
that takes value 1 if the NGO has a religious a¢ liation. The expectation is that religious NGOs
are more altruistic. We also include a female manager dummy to capture various confounding
e¤ects associated with gender including the possibility that female managers are more altruis-
tic. To proxy for favoritism, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether the local NGO
is an a¢ liate of the donor; and whether the NGO is a member of a Ugandan NGO network.
Presumably, NGOs that are better connected have a better change of securing grant funding.
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Table 1 provides a description of the regressors for the whole sample as well as a break down
between grant recipients and others. We also report a simple t-test of the di¤erent between the
two. We see that, among grant recipients, NGO promoters are more likely to have a signicantly
higher level of education, to have more work experience, to have previously worked for the
government, and to have other current employment with an NGO. They are less likely to have
any other kind of current employment. NGOs that are grant recipients are also older, more likely
to be a subsidiary of a foreign NGO, and more likely to belong to a Ugandan NGO network.
These ndings suggest that personal contacts matter: NGOs that receive grants tend to
be those that are better connected. The experience and qualications of the NGO and its
manager also seem to matter, suggesting that grant funding goes to more competent NGOs. In
contrast, the wealth and parental background of the NGO promoter do not show any systematic
relationship with grant recipient status. This constitutes our rst bit of evidence suggesting
that donors regard local NGOs as sub-contractors more than altruistic partners.
We also see at the bottom of the Table that grant recipients are less likely to raise voluntary
contributions from members and local private donors. The di¤erence is statistically signicant
but not large in magnitude. This is because most Ugandan NGOs raise some contributions from
members. In aggregate, grants represent around 80% of total NGO funding in Uganda while
internal and local funding from private contributors accounts for less than 3%. However, there
are large di¤erences between NGOs in the proportion of their funding that comes from local
private hands. This is because most grant funding goes to a very small number of NGOs, with
the majority of Ugandan NGOs receiving small grants or no grant at all.
In the conceptual section, we hinted that if donors rely on NGO altruism, they should
monitor them less. It follows that donors should use evidence of altruism such as voluntary
contributions by members and promoters to decide how closely to monitor grant recipients.
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To investigate this idea, we examine whether donors are more likely to monitor NGOs for
which voluntary contributions Ci are zero. To this e¤ect, we look at which NGOs are required to
supply monthly and half-yearly nancial accounts. We compare two groups of grant recipients:
those that who receive only a grant and no voluntary contributions, and those that receive both.
We nd that the latter are less likely to have to report nancial accounts than the latter. The
di¤erence is signicant at the 1% level for monthly reports and at the 10% level for the half-yearly
nancial accounts. This suggests that, consistent with model predictions, NGOs that depend on
grant funding or sub-contracting contracts alone have more stringent monitoring requirements.
4.2. Reduced form regressions
Inference based only on univariate comparisons can be misleading because explanatory variables
often interact with each other. We now turn to multivariate analysis and proceed with the
estimation of reduced forms (2.7) and (2.8). We begin by considering simply the determinants
of success in obtaining a grant with only characteristics related to the NGO, excluding promoter
characteristics.16
Results, shown in the rst column of Table 2, conrm several of the univariate ndings: the
likelihood of receiving a grant increases with the age of the NGO, whether it is an a¢ liate of a
foreign NGO, and whether it belongs to a Ugandan network of NGOs. While the rst may be
indicative of NGO experience, the latter two probably capture the role of personal contacts in
accessing grant funding. These ndings suggest that donors have di¢ culties identifying NGOs
they can trust. As pointed out in the conceptual section, this should result in repeated interac-
16We experimented with other NGO characteristics such as whether it is registered, whether it has a formal
a¢ liation with a line ministry, whether it pays taxes, whether it owns land or equipment, whether it is located
in Kampala, and its start-up capital. We also examined whether the likelihood of grant funding depends on the
type of activity in which the NGO is engaged and on the number of districts in which it operates. Finally, we
examined whether total NGO capital matters (value of land, buildings, equipment, and vehicles). None of these
variables turned out to be signicant.
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tion to economize on screening and monitoring. This is indeed what the data suggests: of 161
surveyed NGOs reporting ever receiving a grant, only 9 had never received one in the past. The
NGO age e¤ect is non-linear, peaking at around 3 years of experience and falling thereafter.
Having a religious a¢ liation has a negative sign, but is not signicant. Other variables, such as
whether the NGO targets the poor or is based in the capital city Kampala, have no signicant
e¤ect on success in obtaining a grant.
Next we include manager characteristics. Results are presented in the second column of
Table 2. The results seem to suggest that grant attribution is mostly driven by acquaintance,
with no evidence that competence matters. The age and education of the manager are not
signicant, and experience (proxied by length of tenure in the surveyed NGO and by previous
experience in another NGO) has a negative inuence on the likelihood of obtaining a grant.
NGOs whose manager works in another NGO have a higher likelihood of obtaining a grant, a
nding consistent with the idea that contacts play a role in obtaining grants. As predicted by
the model, wealth indicators have a negative e¤ect: NGO managers who had wealthy parents
and who have a regular job elsewhere are less likely to have obtained a grant.
The last column of Table 2 shows similar results using grant revenue as the dependent
variable. This information is only available for the two thirds of the respondents who reported
information on their revenues.17 Results are by and large similar to those of column 2. The main
di¤erence is that being based in Kampala raises grant income, suggesting that NGOs based in
the capital city tend to receive larger grants. NGOs whose manager is employed by another
NGO also seem to receive more grant funding, although the coe¢ cient is only signicant at the
12% level.
We then compare these results with those for the raising of internal and local resources. We
17Other observations are lost because of missing information on the regressors.
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consider three indicators of local and internal funding: revenues from fees and donations; the
proportion of full-time workers who are volunteers; and whether the NGO receives complimen-
tary usage of equipment or vehicles from other sources. The rst captures the main sources of
internal and local nance which, as we have seen, is quite small in terms of aggregate funding.
The other two capture in kind resources. Volunteers represent 54% of full-time workers and 71%
of part-time workers in the sector as a whole, so the contribution is non-negligible. A quarter of
all NGOs use vehicles belonging to others and a quarter have complimentary usage of equipment
(e.g., computers) that does not belong to them.
The same reduced form regressions are estimated for all three, without and with manager
characteristics. Results, presented in Table 3, show that the factors inuencing internal and local
resources are quite di¤erent from those inuencing grant funding. Contrary to grant funding
where the e¤ect was positive, a¢ liates of a foreign NGO are less likely to rely on local funding
and volunteers. NGO age has a large negative e¤ect on volunteers and complimentary use of
equipment, suggesting that these are temporary palliatives used by young NGOs, not permanent
ways of funding their operation. We also see that religious NGOs and NGOs that targer the
poor use fewer volunteers, a nding that is hard to reconcile with the idea of an altruistic motive
for volunteering but that is consistent with volunteering being a way of jump-starting an NGO
before it receives a grant.
Manager characteristics also have a very di¤erent e¤ect on local resources. The length of
tenure in the current NGO is associated with more revenue from fees and donations, suggesting
that experience is important in raising funds locally. Having an outside job is associated with
volunteering and complimentary use of equipment, two ndings that are again consistent with
e¤orts to jump-start an NGO with limited resources.
From this reduced form analysis we conclude that the factors that determine success in at-
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tracting grant funding are quite di¤erent from those that inuence internal ressources. Grant
funding seems to be inuenced largely by network e¤ects being an a­ iate of an international
NGO, belonging to an NGO network, or having a manager who works for another NGO. Vol-
unteers and complimentary equipment, in contrast, seem to be resources that young NGOs
mobilize in order to jump-start their operations, perhaps in the hope of obtaining grant funding
later on. Only fees and donations from local private sources depend on manager experience.
4.3. Testing for crowding-out
Next we turn to the estimation of equation (2.9). Instrumented results are reported in Table
4 together with the grant instrumenting equation. The grant variable is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 if the NGO ever received a grant. Instruments include whether the NGO
manager has previously worked for government and whether the manager has relatives abroad.
These variables may help the NGO get the necessary contacts with international donors, but by
themselves they are not expected to help the NGO raise private funds locally. The instruments
are jointly signicant, albeit not very strongly. They also pass the overidentication test for
all three instrumented regressions. Haussman exogeneity test fails to reject the presence of
grant endogeneity. Given the small size of the sample and the standard di¢ culty of identying
fully convincing instruments, these results should nevertheless be considered as tentative and
illustrative.
Results indicate that grants are negative correlated with the raising of local resources: the
instrumented grant variable has a negative sign in all three regressions. The e¤ect is large in
magnitude but only signicant at the 10% level. Similar results are obtained if manager char-
acteristics are omitted.18 These results are not very strong but given the di¢ culty of obtaining
18Because revenues from fees and donations are only reported for a subset of respondents, we also seek to
address the reporting issue using a Heckman selection model. Results are not reported here to save space. The
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the information required for such a test and the absence of any rigorous evidence on this issue
in developing countries, they nevertheless provide valuable if impressionistic information.
Our ndings is consistent with crowding out: NGOs that obtain grant funding raise fewer
resources locally. As explained earlier, this nding could be because individual NGOs reduce the
mobilization of local resources after receiving a grant, or because donors select grant recipients
that are not as involved in local fundraising. To investigate this, we use the information on
two consecutive income statements reported by respondents to conduct a panel analysis. This
enables us to test whether NGOs reduce fees and donations from private sources after receiving
a grant. Table 5 shows the results from an NGO xed e¤ect regression of revenue from fees
and donations on grant revenue. We see that an increase in grant revenue is associated with
an increase in income coming from fees, but not with an increase in donations. The total net
e¤ects on contributions from private sources is not signicant.
Taken together, results suggest that the crowding out e¤ect observed in Table 4 is thus due
to donor selection. NGOs that are successful at getting grants from international donors are
signicantly less likely to raise local resources. But once they receive a grant, they do not reduce
internal funding. If anything, the income they generate from membership fees increases. This is
probably because grant revenue enables the NGO to o¤er more services to members, in exchange
of which they receive more user fees. This interpretation is reinforced by the observation that
most NGOs o¤er services to their members (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens 2005). At the same time,
the income generated from donations probably a concept closer to altrustic contributions 
does not fall with grant income, suggesting that crowding out is not present at the level of
individual NGOs.
The negative relationship observed in Table 4 between external and internal funds must
key nding is that when we control for selection the grant variable remains negative and signicant. The selection
equation also suggests that selectivity bias does not appear to be an issue.
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be due to a selection e¤ect: the NGOs that seek grants and are good at getting them di¤er
from those that are less successful at securing grants. It is as if international donors do not
seek out the most altruistic and charity-minded NGOs when allocating grants. This makes us
suspect that local NGOs are seen by donors more as sub-contractors than as local charitable
organizations that need to be encouraged by outside assistance.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the determinants of internal and external funding for non-
governmental organizations. We begin for formulating a conceptual framework in which altru-
istically motivated NGOs provide a public service to a target beneciary population. We show
that NGO transfers to beneciaries are an increasing function of their wealth and altruism.
They should also increase with their competence or technological advantage in fullling their
social role.
We then examine what happens if such NGOs receive external funding. We show that in the
presence of increasing marginal cost in service delivery, external and internal funds are subsitute:
an increase in external funding reduces the voluntary contribution made by NGO members and
promoters. There is crowding-out of voluntary contributions by external funding. In contrast,
if marginal cost is decreasing, for instance because of threshold e¤ects or xed delivery costs,
then external and internal funding become complementary.
We then examine the decision by an external donor as to which NGO to fund. We show
that donor funding should go to NGOs that are more competent. If donors expect NGOs to be
altruistically motivated, the model predicts that funding should go poorer and more altruistic
NGOs. The model also suggests that donors should monitor more closely NGOs that raise no
internal funds, as this is a sign of self-interested behavior.
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Using a representative survey of NGOs in Uganda, we investigate whether these predictions
are borne by the data. We nd that success in securing grant funding depends primarily on
networking, e.g., whether the NGO is member of an NGO network or umbrella organization,
whether it is an a¢ liate of a foreign NGO, and whether the manager works in another NGO.
This may be because donors nd it di¢ cult to screen local NGOs and tend to rely on networks
to access relevant information. Experience matters, but peaks only after three years of existence.
Manager characteristics correlated with competence are non signicant, and manager experience
and wealth reduce the likelihood of obtaining a grant. We also nd that donors monitor more
closely NGOs that raise no local resources and that they tend to provide grants repeatedly to
the same NGOs.
Di¤erent factors are associated with raising local resources, either through member fees and
donations, through volunteers, or complimentary use of vehicles and equipment. Results suggest
that it is very young organizations, often managed by someone who has a regular employment
elsewhere, who resort to volunteers and complimentary equipment. Manager experience appears
to matter only in raising funds from fees and local donations.
When we use a cross-section analsysis, we nd evidence of crowding out: Ugandan NGOs that
receive grants raise fewer resources locally. However, when we repeat the same analysis using
NGO xed e¤ects, we obtain a di¤erent result, namely that income from member fees increases
when an NGO receives more grant funding. Donations from members, in contrast, remain
unchanged. This result suggests that grant recipients do not reduce local funding after receiving
a grant. The crowding out evidence that comes out of cross-section regressions must be due to
a selection e¤ect: donors select NGOs less involved in raising local resources, a nding that is
what would happen if donors regard NGOs as (for-prot) sub-contractors of their developmental
e¤ort. These ndings contradict the reason often given to justify channeling development funds
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through non-governmental organizations namely that they are more altruistic than government
agencies and thus are less likely to divert development funds for personal gain.
There may be reasons other than altruism for channeling development assistance through
NGOs rather than government agencies. For instance, NGOs may have a lower cost of service
delivery, donors may have a better control over spending and activities, or donors may seek
to further a philosophical or ideological objective that they could not pursue through secular
government agencies.
In the Ugandan case, most NGOs are extremely small and unspecialized (Barr, Fafchamps
& Owens 2005). We are therefore doubtful that they o¤er a lower cost of delivery since they
cannot capture returns to scale and to specialization.19 But because they are more exible
and can be activated faster quickly than government services, NGOs may be well suited for
relief operations and for small, localized, or unconventional interventions. This is consistent
with Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2003) who report that Ugandan NGOs focus on relatively light
interventions, not on the long term delivery of curative health and full-time education. Tighter
nancial control may also be a reason for donors to prefer NGOs. Barr, Fafchamps & Owens
(2003) have indeed shown that Ugandan NGOs are subjected to numerous forms of monitoring
by grant agencies. These issues deserve further investigation.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, total sample, split by those who have received a grant and those who have not
Non-Recipient Recipient Total
Mean N Mean N Mean N T-test P>|t|
Competence
Age 41.41 76 41.31 201 41.34 277 0.084 0.933
Education 14.93 75 15.85 207 15.61 282 -2.318 0.021
Length of time with NGO 4.69 78 6.89 212 6.30 290 -3.400 0.001
Previously worked for NGO 0.49 78 0.44 211 0.45 289 0.774 0.440
Previously worked for Government 0.37 78 0.51 209 0.47 287 -2.052 0.041
Current employment with an NGO 0.24 79 0.41 208 0.36 287 -2.670 0.008
Current other employment 0.79 79 0.53 212 0.60 291 3.994 0.000
Wealth 
Wealthy family 1.79 79 1.79 200 1.79 279 -0.003 0.998
Relative lives abroad 0.36 80 0.44 204 0.42 284 -1.133 0.258
Altruism
Religious affiliation 0.35 77 0.28 207 0.30 284 1.151 0.251
Female 0.20 80 0.26 215 0.24 295 -0.995 0.320
Other
Subsidiary of foreign NGO 0.05 78 0.17 215 0.14 293 -2.580 0.010
Network 0.51 78 0.79 213 0.72 291 -4.887 0.000
Age of NGO 6.41 80 11.14 215 9.86 295 -3.044 0.003
Number of staff 86.56 80 98.66 215 95.38 295 -0.138 0.890
NGO wealth 18,960 80 14,561 215 15,754 295 0.427 0.670
Proportion that raise voluntary contributions 0.98 80 0.91 215 0.93 295 1.887 0.060
Table 2
Determinants of success in obtaining a grant - with/without manager characteristics
Dependent Variable 1 if received grant, 0 otherwise Log of grant revenue
NGO characteristics Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Log NGO age 2.170 4.33 3.390 3.97 5.008 4.23 4.592 2.90
Log NGO age squared -0.388 -2.70 -0.543 -3.12 -0.875 -2.38 -0.782 -1.75
Religious affiliation -0.538 -1.31 -0.737 -1.57 -0.299 -0.37 0.325 0.36
Affiliate of foreign NGO 1.261 1.89 0.412 0.57 2.940 2.67 3.230 2.60
Belongs to a network 1.470 3.49 1.584 3.42 1.484 1.75 1.258 1.35
Headoffice in Kampala 0.579 1.34 0.379 0.70 1.831 2.13 1.488 1.43
Targets the poor 0.088 0.26 0.252 0.57 -0.244 -0.36 -0.241 -0.30
Manager characteristics
Female -0.444 -0.89 0.946 0.97
Log Age of manager -0.727 -0.60 -1.050 -0.54
Log Education of manager 0.964 1.22 0.953 0.57
Log Length of time with NGO -0.895 -1.99 -0.470 -0.65
Previously worked for Government -0.052 -0.11 1.104 1.26
Previously worked for another NGO -1.003 -2.13 -1.012 -1.22
Currently works for another NGO 1.605 2.64 1.426 1.60
Currently has other employment -1.012 -2.11 -0.945 -1.11
From a wealthy family -0.740 -1.89 0.115 0.17
Relative lives abroad 0.809 1.66 0.578 0.59
Constant -2.233 -0.37 -0.300 -0.06 -0.513 -0.44 1.135 0.14
R-squared 0.273 0.387 0.312 0.345
Observations 278 229 190 164
Table 3
Determinants of success in attracting local funding and resources
Dependent Variable Log of fees and donations Proportion of volunteers in workforce 1 if complimentary use of equipment or vehicle
NGO characteristics Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Log NGO age -0.944 -1.34 -1.200 -1.56 -0.163 -3.34 -0.128 -1.97 -0.568 -1.68 -1.023 -2.07
Log NGO age squared 0.059 0.34 0.046 0.23 0.022 1.63 0.010 0.68 0.077 0.80 0.179 1.40
Religious affiliation 0.341 0.54 0.367 0.49 -0.167 -3.69 -0.142 -2.86 0.170 0.56 0.034 0.10
Affiliate of foreign NGO -2.435 -2.69 -3.148 -3.68 -0.193 -3.00 -0.186 -2.77 0.101 0.26 -0.037 -0.08
Belongs to a network 0.094 0.15 -0.235 -0.36 -0.038 -0.81 -0.007 -0.14 -0.050 -0.17 -0.227 -0.67
Headoffice in Kampala -2.250 -3.56 -1.922 -2.66 -0.077 -1.55 -0.015 -0.26 -0.486 -1.52 -0.626 -1.59
Targets the poor -0.724 -1.38 -0.724 -1.33 -0.076 -1.88 -0.089 -1.98 -0.284 -1.11 -0.252 -0.83
Manager characteristics
Female -0.510 -0.70 0.000 0.00 -0.603 -1.66
Log Age of manager 0.630 0.48 -0.086 -0.77 -0.670 -0.81
Log Education of manager -1.406 -1.21 -0.074 -0.55 1.400 1.36
Log Length of time with NGO 1.200 2.28 0.018 0.51 0.228 0.88
Previously worked for Government -0.761 -1.23 0.026 0.56 -0.354 -1.09
Previously worked for another NGO -0.425 -0.77 0.031 0.68 0.336 -1.13
Currently works for another NGO -0.523 -0.85 0.007 0.14 -0.090 -0.27
Currently has other employment 0.635 1.07 0.148 3.06 0.660 2.18
From a wealthy family 0.161 0.29 -0.062 -1.46 -0.126 -0.43
Relative lives abroad -0.576 -0.85 -0.002 -0.05 -0.159 -0.48
Constant 7.879 8.25 8.798 1.56 0.851 16.35 1.292 2.40 0.568 1.43 -0.005 0.00
R-squared 0.254 0.366 0.245 0.305 0.092 0.040
Observations 190 164 274 225 278 229
Table 4
Determinants of success in raising volunarty contributions
Instrumenting regression
Dependent variable 1 if received a grant Log fees & donations Proportion of volunteers 1 if use vehicles & equip.
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Received a grant (instrumented) -6.423 -1.81 -1.096 -1.72 -1.212 -1.77
NGO characteristics
Log NGO age 4.950 4.98 1.981 0.94 0.383 1.17 0.339 0.93
Log NGO age squared -0.094 -3.71 -0.558 -1.27 -0.080 -1.32 -0.059 -0.86
Religious affiliation -0.071 -1.04 -0.045 -0.06 -0.253 -2.76 -0.095 -0.85
Affiliate of foreign NGO 0.119 1.30 -2.306 -2.31 -0.084 -0.70 0.116 0.78
Belongs to a network 0.206 3.07 1.039 1.10 0.225 1.36 0.210 1.13
Headoffice in Kampala 0.094 1.34 -1.278 -1.58 0.035 0.41 -0.082 -0.78
Targets the poor -0.054 -0.93 -1.063 -1.77 -0.060 -0.90 -0.029 -0.34
Manager characteristics
Female -0.210 -0.30 0.696 -1.04 -0.030 -0.39 -0.201 -2.00
Log Age of manager -0.176 -1.12 -0.465 -0.35 -0.087 -0.54 -0.259 -1.24
Log Education of manager 0.006 0.05 -1.470 -1.29 0.119 0.64 0.461 2.16
Log Length of time with NGO -0.082 -1.65 0.639 1.07 -0.076 -0.92 -0.055 -0.56
Previously worked for another NGO -0.128 -2.25 -1.283 -1.71 -0.094 -1.02 -0.204 -1.81
Currently works for another NGO 0.145 2.35 0.454 0.58 0.206 1.70 0.188 1.37
From a wealthy family -0.105 -1.97 -0.401 -0.68 -0.137 -1.70 -0.100 -1.09
Instruments
Previously worked for Government 0.096 1.46
Currently has other employment -0.057 -0.97
Relative lives abroad 0.131 1.98
Constant 1.025 1.59 9.725 1.51 1.237 1.80 0.913 1.03
Centered R-squared 0.404 0.282 -0.594 -0.515
F(3,146) p-value
Joint F-test of instruments 2.54 0.058
Chi-sq(2) p-value Chi-sq(2) p-value Chi-sq(2) p-value
Overidentification test 0.411 0.814 1.622 0.444 0.687 0.709
Chi-sq(4) p-value Chi-sq(4) p-value Chi-sq(4) p-value
Haussman endogeneity test 1.400 0.237 5.260 0.994 4.300 0.998
Observations 164 164 225 229
IV IV IV
Table 5
Fixed effect estimation
Dependent variable: Revenue from (1) Fees and donations (2) Fees (3) Donations
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Log grant revenue 0.066 0.98 0.135 2.76 -0.054 -0.89
Year dummy - 2000=1 -0.383 -1.94 -1.070 -0.75 -0.522 -2.93
Overall R-squared 0.12 0.08 0.09
p-value p-value
F test that fixed effects = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 352 352 352
